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resolution, and take far fewer resources than litigation. A
complaint can also be the vehicle for a political effort to en-
sure parent involvement in a given migrant education
program or project.
Although problems will vary from state to state and
LEA to LEA, and only migrant parents and their represen-
tatives can determine the greatest need and the best strategies
for a particular locale, we offer this as a suggested general
strategy: The first complaints filed should concern state
PACs. Hopefully, with a comparatively small amount of ef-
fort we can soon obtain vigorous and effective state PACs in
each state which can affect the migrant education program
throughout the entire state.
The next effort should be complaints directed at
achieving knowledgeable and aggressive PACs in key local
school districts.
The third stage of complaints should involve the more
difficult issues of program content: What is taught, who
teaches, how are subjects taught, what supportive services are
necessary to ensure learning, and so on.
Migrant advocates, especially legal services workers,
should view MLAP as a clearinghouse for this parent in-
volvement strategy. Our collective experience with these com-
plaints will enable MLAP to push OE to establish a respon-
sive complaint resolution procedure and to resolve individual
complaints to our clients' satisfaction. We must utilize the
complaint system on a wide level and push it to evaluate its
potential. Only then will we bring about the kind of parent
participation we need to improve the education of migrant
children.
INDIAN LAW SUPPORT CENTER
NARF, 1506 Broadway. Boulder, CO 80302, (303) 447-8760
Indian Monies and Welfare Eligibility
Introduction
The receipt by Indians - who are receiving federal or
state welfare assistance - of claims judgment monies, lease
or royalty payments from trust lands, and damage awards in
actions brought by the United States on their behalf raises
important issues for legal services attorneys.
Types of Welfare
1. Aid to Families with Dependent Children. The
Federal Public Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§301 et seq.,
authorizes federal financial aid to states that submit a plan
conforming to the requirements of the Act and that receive
approval of their plans by federal authorities. Federal finan-
cial assistance to a state electing to participate in the AFDC
program is conditioned on the state's adherence to the
recipient eligibility standards set forth in the Act and reg-
ulations. The penalty imposed on a state for failure to adhere
to the federal criteria is the withdrawal of federal assistance.'
The right of American Indians to receive state welfare
benefits has been settled only recently,' but the establishment
1. The legal effect of a state's participation in the federal program
with respect to so-called "need related standards" is clear, i.e.,
states are bound by the federal criteria with respect to the
definition of income and its inclusion in the computation of
AFDC grants due to the supremacy clause of the Constitu-
tion. See Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970); Tiry v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309 (1968). However, the states have much more
flexibility under federal law in devising and implementing "non-
need related standards" as the means of decreasing their welfare
recipient rolls. New York State Department of Social Welfare v.
Dublino, 412 U.S. 405 (1973).
2. Acosta v. San Diego County, 126 Cal. App.2d 455, 272 P.2d 92
(1954), held that since Indians living on a reservation in Califor-
of this right has raised another problem: May the state in-
clude Indian monies as "countable income or resources" in
the determination of the amount of the AFDC grant an In-
dian recipient shall receive?
2. Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Aged, disabled
and blind Indians may also qualify for federal welfare and
state supplemental assistance, if any, under the relatively new
SSI program. Pub. L. No. 92-603,42 U.S.C. §§1381 etseq.
3. County Poor Relief. County poor relief or medical
assistance may be available to Indians who do not fit within
the "categories of assistance" set forth by SSI and AFDC.
State- or county-administered poor relief must be consistent
with constitutional standards.' However, there appears to be
no reason why the county must exempt any form of Indian
monies or resources in considering an Indian's eligibility for
such aid. Such assistance is not governed by the Social
Security Act, and the state has wide discretion to set stan-
dards that are not discriminatory and are rationally related to
its goals.'
Indian Monies
The term "Indian monies" embraces income to Indians
from several sources.' It includes, among other items, per
nia are citizens of the state, the county is required by the
privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment
to include them in its welfare program.
F. S. Cohen agrees that all Indians, as citizens, are en-
titled to both state and federal welfare benefits under the four-
teenth and fifth amendments. F. S. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIA'N
LAW, p. 244 (N.M. reprint 1971).
3. In Hawk v. Fenner, 3% F. Supp. 1 (D. S.D. 1975), the court held
that the state may not apply a durational residency test to an In-
dian who was otherwise qualified for such assistance.
4. See generally Welfare Laws, 79 Am.Jur.2d §§49-74 (1975). Ad-
ditionally, states and counties may argue that they are "jurisdic-
tionally disabled" to assist Indians (and presumably non-
Indians) who are residents of Indian reservations within the
state and county. White v. Califano, 581 F.2d 697 (8th Cir.
1978).
5. Whiskers v. United States, No. 77-1620 (10th Cir., June 14,
1979). The court, in rejecting the Indian plaintiffs' claim that
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capita distributions of judgment monies awarded by the In-
dian Claims Commission, proceeds from the sale of trust
lands and other assets, lease payments from trust lands, and
damage awards in actions brought by the United States on
behalf of its wards against third parties. All these monies
typically are held by the United States as trustee for its Indian
beneficiaries in identified, individual accounts. 25 C.F.R.
§§104 et seq.
The regulations defining the duties of the Secretary of
the Interior in the management and disbursement of these
accounts treat adult Indians differently from minor Indians.
Adult Indians, regardless of their status as restricted Indians,
may withdraw funds from their accounts upon proper
demand. 25 C.F.R. §104.3. A minor's funds, however, can
be disbursed only in such amounts deemed necessary for
the minor's support, health, education or welfare under a
plan approved by the Secretary. Such a request for a release
of funds may be made by the minor's legal guardian or the
person having a right to control and custody of the minor.
There is no general statutory exemption of Individual
Indian Monies (IIM) from inclusion as income in deter-
mining the grant amount an Indian is to receive under AFDC
or SSI. Indeed, the general law is to the contrary. 42 U.S.C.
§602(aX8) (Supp. 1979) provides that "the state agency shall
take into consideration any other income and resources of
any child or relative claiming aid to families with dependent
children in determining the need of the child or relative
claiming such aid." (Emphasis added.) This rule of general
income inclusion, subject to specific exceptions, governs SSI
as well. Consequently, Indian recipients must argue for either
an express or implied exception of Indian monies that they
receive from inclusion as income or resources in the welfare
agency's determination of their eligibility for assistance.
The Governing Rules
Generally, under both the SSI and AFDC programs, all
monies and resources of the recipient are to be considered
unless expressly exempted from such consideration by stat-
ute. See 42 U.S.C. §1382(a), 20 C.F.R. Part 416, subparts K
and L (SSI); and 42 U.S.C. §602, 45 C.F.R. 233.20 (AFDC).
Specific exemptions in favor of Indians do exist,
however:
(1) Claims Judgment Funds. 25 U.S.C. §1407 exempts
congressional awards of funds to Indians in satisfaction of
judgments of the Indian Claims Commission or the Court of
Claims from consideration as income or resources when wel-
fare agencies determine the extent of eligibility or assistance
under the Social Security Act.'
the United States breached its trust obligations under the
Southern Paiute Judgment Distribution Act (82 Stat. 147),
discussed whether funds appropriated by Congress to pay the
land claims settlement constituted "Indian monies" under 31
U.S.C. §725S(a),(20) (1976). It found that they did not.
6. The Oregon Court of Appeals accepted the Indian plaintiffs'
argument in Burke v. Adult Family Services Division, 590 P.2d
250 (1979), that 25 U.S.C. §1407 impliedly exempted per capita
shares of the Umatilla Reservation Tribal Judgment Fund even
though that judgment fund had been established prior to the ef-
fective date of the Act, October 19, 1973. The court viewed sec-
tion 1407 as having the substantive purpose of exempting the
class of monies donated as "judgment funds" regardless of
(2) Submarginal Land Act, 25 U.S.C. §459e. This Act
exempts all property, and the receipts therefrom, conveyed
pursuant to §459e to tribes from being considered as income;
45 C.F.R. 233.20(a)(4Xm) (1979). This is true even if the tribal
members receive a distribution of per capita shares of the
receipts.
(3) Educational Grants. Any grant or loan adminis-
tered by the Commission of Education to any undergrad-
uate student for educational purposes is totally exempt for
purposes of determining eligibility for AFDC, 45 C.F.R.
§233.20(aXd) (1979). However, loans or grants from the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, as well as loans or scholarships
from any other sources, are only partially exempt to the ex-
tent that their conditions of use preclude their application to
current living expenses. 45 C.F.R. §233.20(aX3) (1979).'
(4) Other IIM Monies. IIM monies are subject to the
administration of the Secretary of the Interior. Sharp lim-
itations are placed on these monies so entrusted to his care.
He may not make gifts or donations on behalf of an Indian
from an Indian's funds. He may not create private trusts and
transfer an Indian's money to that trust. He is authorized to
pay only necessary medical and funeral expenses and other
expenses where specific authority has been granted by the
Congress. Generally, debts may not be paid by the Secretary
out of an Indian's funds.
Consequently, if IIM monies were considered simply as
a species of federal benefits such as Social Security benefits,
unemployment compensation or Veterans Administration
benefits, all of which do, or may, constitute income and
available resources for the purpose of computing the amount
of a grant under the states' AFDC programs, then Indian
monies could be treated as income or resources. 45 C.F.R.
§233.20(4Xi) (1979).
when the judgment fund was established by Congress or whether
the distribution plan governing the disbursement of those funds
was developed pursuant to the Act or not.
Unfortunately, judgment funds distributed per capita to
terminated Indians are not exempt. 20 C.F.R. §416.1146(c).
This provision may affect the Klamath Indians' receipt of
judgment funds in light of the imminent per capita distribution
of those funds pursuant to enabling legislation enacted prior to
October 19, 1973.
7. Constitutional challenges to the classification of OE-ad-
ministered grants and loans as totally exempt as distinct from
other governmental loans and grants have been rejected.
8. See F. S. COHEN, FEDERAL INDLAN LAW, p. 201 (N.M. reprint
1971); See also 25 C.F.R. §11.26 (Payment of Judgments from
Individual Indian Monies) (the Secretary has discretion to pay
money judgment awards entered against an Indian by the Court
of Indian Offenses from an Indian's IIM account).
9. SSI obviously regards Indian recipients' per capita payments
(that are not specifically exempted) from trust resources
countable either as income or resources, depending on the treat.
ment that is appropriate. Randall v. Califano, No. 77-0626-
WWS (Memorandum Order, Feb. 9, 1978). Whether this is a
questionable practice is examined below.
Unfortunately, IIM funds are regarded by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) as "countable resources" for the purpose of
determining eligibility under General Assistance (GA) guide-
lines. The BIA regards the GA program as supplementary to
state welfare programs; that is, an Indian must seek state
welfare assistance and be denied prior to being considered by
BIA-GA. Further, receipt of state AFDC assistance disqualifies
Indians for BIA-GA even if the BIA payments exceed state
AFDC payments because of a state's election of a "percentage of
JUNE 1980
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However, absent specific congressional authority, it is
debatable whether a state welfare agency can force an Indian
to "utilize" his or his children's monies for current living ex-
penses. See Chase v. McMasters, 573 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 965 (1979). There appears to be
no explicit statutory authorization, or an administrative
mechanism, for a state to force an Indian to "utilize" those
monies. It would seem that these funds are just not available
and for that reason could not be considered by the AFDC
authorities. Greene v. Barnes, 485 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1973),
Randall v. Goldmark, 495 F.2d 356 (1st Cir. 1974).
(5) Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA),
43 U.S.C. §§1601-1626 (Supp. 1979). Funds received by
native enrollees under the Act may not be deemed to be a sub-
stitute "for any governmental programs otherwise available"
to them as citizens of the United States and Alaska. Section
1626 also specifies that any compensation, revenue,
remuneration or other benefit received by a member of the
household shall be disregarded when determining eligibility
for the Food Stamp Program, 7 U.S.C. §§2014 et seq.
(6) Exclusion of Indian Lands. 20 C.F.R. §416.1234 ex-
cludes, for purposes of SSI, Indian lands from the determina-
tion of resources of an individual (and spouse, if any) who is
of Indian descent from a federally recognized tribe. This ex-
clusion includes such restricted, allotted lands as the person
holds if he cannot sell, transfer or otherwise dispose of such
lands without the permission of other individuals, his tribe or
an agency of the federal government.
There appears to be no comparable exclusion for In-
dians' lands under the AFDC regulations. However, a state's
effort to require an Indian to sell his trust land and "utilize"
the proceeds therefrom for the maintenance of his minor
children who are otherwise eligible for AFDC would likely
violate the Indian's federal right to have his land maintained
in trust. Chase v. McMasters, 573 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 965 (1979).
Implied Exemptions
Assuming that the Indian recipient of welfare also
receives Indian monies that are nonexempt, the welfare
authorities may seek to recover the amount of the over-
payment, if any, that occurred.'"
Generally speaking, there can be no implied exemption
of welfare recipient's income or resources. 3 SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 71.08. However, courts have
need" plan (i.e., an award of 90 percent of established need
rather than 100 percent of established need).
10. The fact of overpayment gives rise to a claim in favor of the
United States or the state involved. If the overpayment cannot
be recovered by adjustment during the recipient's life, it can be
presented in the appropriate proceedings as a claim against the
estate of the deceased recipient. 20 C.F.R. §416.537 and 20
C.F.R. 416.570. But a state may not recover on a claim against
an Indian's estate based on welfare assistance extended during
the decedent's life. Running Horse v. Udall, 211 F. Supp. 586
(D. D.C. 1962); 43 C.F.R. §4.250(g).
AFDC regulations allow for the recoupment of over-
payments, primarily based on fraud or misrepresentation,
against the recipient's available income and resources (including
disregarded or set aside or reserved items) 45 C.F.R. §233.20(f).
recognized implied exemptions in the tax area in favor of In-
dian trust property. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
As the basis for such an implied exemption argument in favor
of Indians in the welfare area, 25 U.S.C. §410 provides that:
No money accruing from any lease or sale of lands
held in trust by the United States for any Indian shall
become liable for the payment of any debt of, or claim
against, such Indian contracted or arising during such
trust period, or, in case of a minor, during his minority,
except with the approval and consent of the Secretary of
the Interior. June 21, 1906, c.3504, 34 Stat. 327. (Em-
phasis added.)
This section seems to preclude, prima facie, a claim
against an Indian welfare recipient that seeks to recover an
overpayment against monies from trust lands. In interpreting
this section, one court held that it barred a real estate broker
from recovering against an Indian's rental profits from leased
trust lands without the Secretary of the Interior's approval. In
re Guardianship of Prieto's Estate, 52 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1966)
But further argument is needed to make this argument
effective against recovery by SSI and the state from trust
monies. First, it appears that as a matter of due process, it is
necessary even for the Social Security Administration to ob-
tain the Interior Secretary's review and consent before assert-
ing any claim against the Indian's monies that originated
from a trust source. This obligation is similar to that imposed
on the Federal Power Commission to determine that the
granting of a federal water power license on an Indian reser-
vation will not interfere, or be inconsistent with, the purpose
for which the reservation was created. LacCourte Oreilles
Band of Indians v. Federal Power Commission, 510 F.2d 198
(D. D.C. 1975). In LacCourte Oreilles Band of Indians the
Tribe sought review of an order of the FPC issuing an interim
license to the original licensee of a project on the reservation
despite the Tribe's refusal to consent to the use of its land for
the project. The Tribe argued that a federal treaty prevented
such use and that the grant of the license necessarily in-
terfered with the reservation's purposes. While the court
upheld the FPC's power to issue an interim license under sec-
tion 15 of the Federal Water Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §1808(b),
it also said that the Act conditioned the FPC's authority to
grant such a license initially on its ability to find "that the
license will not interfere with or be inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the reservation." 510 F.2d at 211. The court em-
phasized that the Tribe's right under statute and relevant
treaties must be assessed in order to comply with section 4(e)
of the Act. 510 F.2d at 212.
The Social Security Administration in its regulations
acknowledges its duty to exclude payments or other benefits
provided under a federal statute (other than Title XVI of the
Social Security Act) where exclusion is required by such
statute. 20 C.F.R. §416.1218. The argument here is that due
process requires the Social Security Administration to make
findings regarding the effect of 25 U.S.C. §410 on any over-
payment claims arising due to an Indian's receipts of lease
monies from trust lands. Further, if the funds involved are
within the protection of 25 U.S.C. §410, then SSA must
procure the approval and consent of the Secretary of the In-
terior before proceeding with the claim.
Secondly, it could be argued that the Secretary of the
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Interior is without authority to allow these claims because it
would interfere with his obligation to deliver the trust allot-
ment (if that is the source of the income) free and clear of en-
cumbrance. 25 U.S.C. §348. See United States v. Rickert, 188
U.S. 432 (1903), and Running Horse v. Udall, 211 F. Supp.
586 (D. D.C. 1962).
However, can SSI and the state merely base the fact of
overpayment on the receipt of Indian monies from an en-
during trust source? This case arises when the claimed over-
payment would be recovered by the welfare authorities by way
of adjustment during the recipient's life. See 25 C.F.R.
§§416.537 and 416.570. The welfare authority would argue
that although the overpayment may be based on the receipt of
the Indian monies, no claim is being made against those
monies. The overpayment would be recouped against the
recipient's future welfare payments. In Swasey v. Shalen, 526
F.2d 831 (1st Cir. 1977), the court allowed the state to recoup
AFDC overpayments to recipients by reducing the recipient's
earned-income disregard by 50 percent. The court reasoned
that this practice was not precluded by congressional policy
or otherwise:
But recoupment generally requires no author-
ization. One might hesitate to identify the state's right as
recoupment rather than equitable setoff, but there is no
ground for denying the existence of the power as a start-
ing point for the occasions on which there is a right to
exercise it. The state in any other context could as a mat-
ter of course withhold payment until the debt owed to it
was paid. 526 F.2d at 836.
Consequently, the fiscal concerns which allow the state
to claim part of the federally disregarded earned income as a
recoupment of an overpayment may allow the state to "off-
set" or adjust the Indian welfare recipient's AFDC payments
based on his contemporaneous receipt of Indian monies de-
rived from trust land.
Conclusion
Conflict between the rights that an Indian has due to
his Indian status and the rights that he has as a citizen are
unavoidable. Indian lawyers must seek to reconcile those
benefits and burdens - as well as they can.
Raymond Cross
Barbara Rath
11. The Court of Claims decision in Critzer v. United States, No.
134-75 (Ct. Cl., Apr. 18, 1979), an Indian tax case, also suggests
that a court, if presented with this issue, would not find a direct
conflict with 25 U.S.C. §410 if the state sought to adjust the
overpayment by way of a setoff.
NLADA ACCESS TO JUSTICE PROJECT
1625 K St., NW, Suite 800, Washington, DC 20006, (202)
452-0620
Recent Legislative Activity
As the %th Congress moves into its last few months
of activity, the Access to Justice Project is pleased to report
several recent legislative successes in guaranteeing the access
of legal services clients to the federal courts. Of course, a
great deal more remains to be done.
Civil Rights of the Institutionalized
On May 6, 1980, the Senate approved final passage of
the conference report to H.R.10, the Civil Rights of the In-
stitutionalized bill, by a vote of 56-37. The House approved
the report by a voice vote on May 12. This bill, which gives the
United States Attorney General standing to assert the federal
rights of persons in state institutions, stands as one of the few
civil rights initiatives of this Congress.
Although both Houses of Congress had previously
passed somewhat differing versions of the bill, the Senate's
final approval was far from certain. Calling it "one of the
most dangerous bills that has come before Congress in the 26
years I have been a member," Senator Thurmond (R-SC)
joined Senators Danforth (R-MO), Boren (D-OK) and Exon
(D-NE) in a week-long filibuster reminiscent of the civil rights
battles of the 1960s. It took the bill's proponents, led by
Senators Bayh (D-IN) and Hatch (R-UT), four attempts
before they were able to obtain the support of the 60 senators
necessary to achieve cloture and cut off debate by the very
tight vote of 60-34. (See Late-breaking news under the Mental
Health Law Project's column in this issue.)
Social Security Judicial Review
The House-Senate Conference Committee considering
H.R.3236, the Social Security Disability Amendments, re-
jected an attempt by the Senate to change the standard for
judicial review in Social Security cases from "substantial
evidence" to "arbitrary and capricious." The current section4 05(g) standard was left intact.
The Social Security Administration had urged that fac-
tual review of Social Security decisions be eliminated in
response to the federal court reversal-remand rate in favor of
claimants of approximately 50 percent. Senator Long (D-LA),
Chairman of the Finance Committee which had jurisdiction
over the legislation, actively supported the Social Security
Administration's position. He used the rather curious
argument that review should be limited to legal questions
because overly sympathetic juries were too freely second-
guessing the factual determinations of administrative lawjudges. In reality, review is limited to the record and there are
no trials of any sort. However, based on considerable pressure
from the Chairman, the Committee and subsequently the
Senate, adopted the "arbitrary and capricious" language
which was proposed as a compromise by Senator Ribicoff (D-
CT).
In Conference, the House conferees, led by Rep. Pickle
(D-TX), stood firmly by their chamber's position that the
standard not be changed. After it became clear that the
Senate Conferees were split on the issue, the Senate yielded to
the House version.
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